SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Notes Towards an Alternate Vision of the Judicial Role
Andrew M. Siegelt
INTRODUCTION

It has been roughly a quarter-century since William Rehnquist took
over as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Under first his
stewardship and then that of his former clerk John Roberts, the Supreme
Court has grown increasingly skeptical about the efficacy of litigation,
increasingly parsimonious in construing federal statutes that facilitate
litigation, and increasingly uninterested in insuring the availability
of functional remedies for the violation of federal rights.' I n matters of
interpretation—both statutory and constitutional—the Court's course has
been more complicated, but it would be difficult to contest the assertion
Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. B A , Yale University; JD, New
York University School of Law; MA in History, Princeton University. This Essay and the others in
this Symposium arise out of a roundtable in which the Symposium authors participated at the 2008
Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting. I would like to thank the organizers of
that conference and the audience participants for nourishing this project and the editors of the Seattle
University Law Review for giving it a home. Special thanks also to the other symposium participants
for stimulating my own ideas. Their contributions all appear in this volume, except for those of
Amanda Frost. F o r those interested in her ideas on this topic, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
1. For discussion of these themes during the Rehnquist Era, see for example Daniel J. Meltzer,
The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. C I. REV. 343, 343 (2002); Judith Resnik,
Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223,
224 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006). Dur ing its first
few years under the stewardship of Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has given no indication that it is
deviating from its anti-litigation course. Indeed, the court-closing consequences of the Court's decisions were the lead story in most analyses of October Term 2006. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In
Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al (describing
October Term 2006 as "the year the Court closed the courts"); Posting o f Andrew Siegel to
PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsb1awg.blogs.comiprawfsblawg/2007/06/hostility_to_li.html, "Litigation
Hostility in the Early Roberts Court" (June 6, 2007, 10:41 PST).
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that it has tacked in the direction of more formalistic approaches that
increasingly focus our attention on statutory text and historical evidence
at the expense of other forms of evidence and argument.
The Court's course in these matters has been justified by—and
2
perhaps propelled b y
vision,
judges play a limited and secondary role in the maintenance of
3
the
— aAmerican polity. Judges exist to resolve disputes and answer technical
p aquestions
r t i c about
u l a the
r meaning of statutes and discrete constitutional
and categorically prohibited from "making
vtexts.
i They
s i are
o definitively
n
law."
Even
within
their
narrow
sphere of permissible activity, judges are
4
not
to
be
proactive,
but
rather
are
to sit back and wait to see if Congress,
o
f
in its infinite wisdom, has chosen to break the glass and call on their
t
h
expertise. As Chief Justice Roberts evocatively opined,
e
understand
s j u d g their
e s role
p tor act
o as
p "umpires,"
e d y making sure that pre-existing
jruiesuare _areirf*AY-i-P4id
d
i
even-handedi
cway
a r as
y e as
ri imuch
to
c l epossible
rd i The
o Rehnquist
s to conremedies
and d
Roberts
a n
:
land
e
aye.,.. for the
$ tshrink
a ythei universe.
n g ' ofoacceptable
t n
.o
f
It
h
e
n 2. Though a citation should be unnecessary, one might see William Michael Treanor. T ak i
ng Seriously:
tText Too
h Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and Amos's Bill of Rights, 106 Mt
Rsv. 487, 488 (2007) ("In less than twenty years, textualism has moved from the periphery of conistitutional discourse
s to a position of the greatest prominence") and Jonathan T. Moist, The Rise and
Foil of Textualism, 106 CoLutd. L. REV. I ( 2.0(
ing
1 smug puoposivism and updating. theirmew brand of tngt.lerg Wqualisin that they have forged a
new
6) (consensus
" ' l e on
x tthe
u interpretive
a l i s t s anterpriSe that dwarf' any remaining disagreementS"),
h
a3. -Whether
v
e recent shills i n Supreme Court doctrine and methodology have actually been
motivated
opposed
Sc simply justified by—a principled commitment to a limited judicial role
b
e by—as
e
n
is &matter of passionate dispute that this -Essay cannot resolve and will not engage. For my earlier
s
o
view on the topic, see Siegel, supra note a t 11 7 (rejecting explanation of the Rehitquist Court's
scourticlosing
u c cdecisions
e sgrounded
s fi inaseparation
l
of powers concerns):
d
i Mys decision
c tor talkeaboutd"Visions"
i
t of the judielal role is•heiVily influenced by the work of
4.
-my fonner colleague, Tontrily Crocker, who argues that disputes about constitutional doctrine. stmctur eand methodology are, at bottom, arguments about hove we "envision" an ideal constitutional
culture. See Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 5.; Am. U. L. REV, 1 (2007). I t is
also driven by my sense that the ideas about the judicial role that have currency in our constitutional
culture are insufficiently fleshed out to count as 'theories," but go well beyond mete "notions.'
of how such conversations ought to be pitched, see infra Part LA.
i n s t i n cFor
t s "further
o discussion
r
those who resist the visual metaphor, "conceptions" might be the best substitute.
5: Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judielaiy, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of G. Roberts. Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) ("Judges ate like umpires.
In
- ake, ' .r e everybody plays by the roles, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a:ball game to
see
_
m the umpire.").
i r 6. But see Michael P._ Allen, A (Limited) Defense o,
SEATTLE
U L REv. 525 (2009) (arguing that the anal°
e
active
judicial
mOdel).
s
d
o
n
'
t
m
a
k
e
t
h
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most part, been hotly contested] Many have drawn stinging dissents
which, particularly i n recent years, have expressly identified and
contested the Court's anti-litigation orientation.
ranging
8 I n from
a implied
v aprivate
r i eright
t y of action cases to technical cases
interpreting
the
scope
o
f
the
Federal
o f Appellate Procedure,
o
f
a r e a s Rules
,
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter have taken turns questioning the wisdom, the historical accuracy, and even the interpretive
integrity of the Court's court-closing decisions•
tors
9 Ahave
c a echoed—and
d e m i c expanded upon—their criticisms," as have
politicians
c o m and
m popular
e n commentators."
t a Intriguingly, however, those who have been quick to criticize the
substance of the Court's decisions and its anti-litigation orientation have
not, as yet, done much to challenge the vision of the judicial role that
undergirds the Court's approach. W h ile an occasional Justice might
explicitly contest the majority's approach to statutory interpretation" or
their framework for deciding, say, private right o f action cases," the
Justices rarely dig deeper to critique, let alone offer alternatives to, the
broad pronouncements about the judicial role that often dot the Court's
anti-litigation opinions."

7. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 1126-27 (explaining that the Supreme Court's court-closing
decisions have been characterized by "[c]onsistent 5-4 voting patterns and spirited dissents" even
though all nine Justices are to some degree litigation-hostile).
8. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1954 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("In the end, the Court's decision can only be explained by its increasing familiar effort
to guard the floodgates of litigation.").
9
. (Breyer, J., dissenting); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761
3, 2009)
(2008)S (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting);
c
Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
n
10.
In
addition to the works cited supra note 1, see for example Peter Strauss, Courts or
n
Tribunals?
Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891 (2002); Tracy A. Thomas,
g
Proportionality
and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 121-22
S
(2007).
i
2 Note, for example, the strident public criticism of the Court's decision in Ledbetter, 550
r
U.S. 618,
which led to the case becoming an issue in the 2008 Presidential Election and, ultimately,
n
to its statutory
undoing. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
t
(2009).
r
12. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1549 (2007)
u
(Stevens,
J., concurring).
f
13. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
w
q14. The dissenting Justices have not been entirely silent on questions about the judicial role,
particularly
in their off-the-bench writings. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in particular, has attempted to
P
articulate
a an overarching theory of the judicial role, most notably in his book ACTIVE LIBERTY:
r
INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). W hile ACTIVE LIBERTY has not yet made
a
a substantial
dent i n the broader culture's attitudes about the proper judicial role, i t probably
,
deserved
greater attention than we have given it in this Symposium.
I
s
l
a
n
d
I
n
s
t
.
.
N
o
.
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The Justices' unwillingness to explicitly articulate an alternative
vision of the judicial role tracks developments in broader culture. I n the
contemporary United States, the debate over the proper judicial role is
one-sided. We hear the same language with striking persistence: Judges
should "find law" not "make law." "Judicial activism" is bad; "judicial
restraint" is good.
ties
democratic polity, unelected judges should get
I5 in
W our
h complicated
e n
out
of
the
way
and
leave
the heavy lifting to the democratic branches.
i t
To
c do
o otherwise
m e is to live under "judicial tyranny."
the
political
warn
dangers of "judicial supremacy"
16
V
o
i cspectrum
e s
f r ofothem
s
laud
the
virtues
of
judicial
"minimalism."
17
a
n
d
a
t c or o s s
my cbelief—and the premise o f this Symposium—that the
18
a l It lis o
absence from both Supreme Court dissents and public debate o f a
a t i n g
coherent alternative vision o f the judicial role is a failure o f rhetoric
rrather ithan ag failure of ideas. Those of us who have made academic or
h
t
s
professional careers out of critiquing and challenging the parsimonious
a
decisions of the recent Supreme Court find ourselves facing a stacked
n
deck when we turn to the task of articulating an affirmative alternative
d
vision. The language of restraint, minimalism, and passivity are so parardigmatic
e that
s efforts to break out of them often break down over simple
p
o of
n vocabulary.
questions
s would
few
i
embrace the labels "judicial maximalist," "judicial
19
Fi o brvoluntarily
supremacist,"
or
"judicial
activist." Similarly, it is impossible to imagine
rl e i a -s o n s
o
f
b
o
t
h
15. Craig Green carefully traces the intellectual history o f these particular terms i n a
p
o
l
i
t Craig
i Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 62 VAND. L.
forthcoming Article. See
REV.
(forthcoming
2009).
c s
16. See generally, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: How THE SUPREMECOURT IS
a
n
DESTROYINGAMERICA
(2005) (accusing the Supreme Court of "judicial tyranny").
d 17. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115
BARN/.
L.
s
uREV. 4b(2001).s
18. See, e. g. , CA S S R . SUNST EI N, O NE CA S E A T A T I ME: J UDI CI A L M I NI M A LI S M O N T HE
t
a COURT
n (1999).
c Though Professor Sunstein has been the leading academic advocate for
SUPREME
"judicial
e
, minimalism," he also has been willing to acknowledge its faults. See, e.g., Cass R.

Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899 (2006).
19. The power of a prevailing discourse to impose constraints on the ability to give voice
to countervailing instincts and ideas, of course, transcends questions of vocabulary. I n our constitutional culture, for example, we have developed archetypes of the "good judge" and the "bad judge,"
which loom over any discussion o f the judicial role and police the boundaries o f acceptable
argument despite a near-consensus among judges and scholars that the archetypes seriously oversimplify and distort the process of judging. I f , as the archetypes would have it, we are in the midst
of a Manichean struggle between "good judges" (who understand the limited nature of their own
role, forsake the temptation to use the tools of common law adjudication to transform their policy
preferences into law, and develop the humility to tolerate the compromises of imperfect democratic
lawmaking) and "bad judges" (who, drunk with their own power, mistake their own beliefs for legal
commands), judges and commentators have strong political and psychological incentives to associate
themselves with the forces of light, whatever their actual practices.
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a nominee to the Supreme Court analogizing their role to that of a batter
or pitcher in a baseball game.
When the authors in this Symposium gathered for our initial roundtable, we gave ourselves the task of affirmatively and unapologetically
articulating a vision of what it is that courts should be doing. While the
substance of our answers were grounded in our critiques of the Court's
current approach, the goal was to speak in our own language in an effort
to bypass the rhetorical traps set by the politics o f the last several
decades. What became abundantly clear after our two-hour session was
that paradigm-shifting concepts cannot be ordered up on demand; our
progress, though substantial, was incremental.
In preparing essays for the written portion of this Symposium, each
author has taken a slightly different path. Scott Moss, focusing in on the
role of the trial judge in employment cases, identifies a crucial judicial
function that has withered from disuse—the evaluation of conflicting
evidentiary claims dr awing lessons from its decline, and explaining
the single importance of revitalizing it .
Vladeck
2 0 T acalls
k ion
n the
g currentaSupreme Court to account for its failure to
sfulfill
i its
m obligation
i l a to
r give content to the Constitution's criminal procedure
provisions,
offering
a procedural tweak that might get the Court
t
a
c
k
,
back
onto
the
path
of
fulfilling
S
t
e
v
e its law-saying obligations.
teristic
21 W chutzpa,
i t h Mik
c he aAllen
r aattempts
c - to capture the judge-as-umpire
analogy for those who favor a more active judiciary, questioning many of
the Chief Justice's assumptions about both law and baseba11.
Roberts
approach, interrogating our legal order and
22 C atakes
p r ithe
c broadest
e
broader culture for explanations as to why current rules of jurisdiction
and justiciability produce a judiciary that is at crucial moments anemic
and then offering a new paradigm for empowering the Judiciary in some
such cases.
23
further
frame our collective project and then begin to tentatively explore
some
F i n of
a the
l l rhetoric and themes that might be of service in articulating a
new
affirmative
vision of the judicial role.
y ,
i
nThe Essays in this Symposium can be read with profit as standalone
t
hcontributions to legal scholarship. However, they also profit from
being
read together in a single setting. What comes through these piece
es—and a host of other recent scholarship on similar topics by scholars
p a
g e
s 20. Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go
tToo Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549 (2009).
h 21. Steven I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 (2009).
a 22. Allen, supra note 6.
t 23. Caprice L. Roberts, Asymmetric World Jurisprudence, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569 (2009).
f
o
l
l
o
w
,
I
u
s
e
a
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such Neil Siege1,
tion's
24 Ccollective
r a i g frustration with the limited rhetorical and intellectual
space
legal order has marked off for discussions of the
G r that
e ethe
n prevailing
,
judicial
role.
T
his
Symposium
represents an effort to channel some of
2 5
that
frustration
in
a
creative
and
productive
direction.
a
n
d
I. RE-ENVISIONING THE JUDICIAL ROLE: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
C
h
Imagine
a nominee for the United States Supreme Court who
a
d
believes
that,
over the last quarter-century, the Court has become
O l d f a
excessively
formalistic
in its modes of interpretation, unduly hostile to
t h e r
litigation, and inappropriately blasé to the court-closing and rights2 6
limiting consequences of its rulings. Also, imagine our fictional nominee
— i s
to be brave (and perhaps a little foolish). Wh e n asked by Senators
a
whether he considers himself a "judicial activist," this nominee eschews
g
a simpleedenial and offers a sophisticated answer in which he questions
n
e of terms such as "judicial activism" and "judicial restraint."
the utility
r27 asked
a
When
if, like John Roberts, he believes that judges are simply um-pires, he declines the opportunity to riff on baseball, Mom, and apple pie,
and instead offers a nuanced explanation on the virtues and the (serious)
limitations of such an analogy. After several hours of back and forth
about labels, analogies, and particular cases, a prickly Senator from a
bright red state asks the chipper nominee to cut out the fancy footwork
and identify for the Committee his vision of the proper judicial role. The
remainder of this Essay asks two related questions: First, what are the
requisites of a successful answer? And second, how might the nominee
go about constructing such an answer?
A. The Proper Pitch
Any inquiry into the requisites of a successful answer must begin
with the issue of pitch. When people talk about judges, they talk in varying registers and with varying degrees of sophistication. O n the one
24. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008).
25. See Green, supra note 15.
26. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L. J. 121 (2005).
27. Many scholars and commentators have written eloquently about the need to get beyond the
language of "judicial activism." F or a recent comment of my own along this vein, see Posting of
Andrew Siegel t o ProfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com, " A Shared Vision o f the Judicial
Role" (June 26, 2008, 14:28 PST) (commenting that, i n light of recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, "the gap between the reality of constitutional law (in which two groups of judges committed
to a broad judicial role battle over the substance of the rights to be jealously protected) and the
rhetoric of constitutional politics (in which liberal "activists" battle conservatives committed to
"judicial restraint") has grown untenable").
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hand, there is vast academic literature on judges and judging, much of it
sophisticated and nuanced. While we would presumably hope that our
fictional nominee is well-versed in that literature, it would be neither
responsive nor wise for him to respond with a jargon-filled taxonomy of
judicial functions or virtues.
incorporate
28
( I n da edegree
e d ,of academic precision that got him in the hot seat in
ithe first
t place.) So, high theory is out.
On
w
a thes fl ip side, however, the question calls for more than a
political
h
i catch
s phrase or an invective-filled diatribe. While much public
cdiscussion
a u o f tjudging
i otakes place in those terms, the setting and the
stakes require greater engagement with the question. (Perhaps, earlier in
u s
the proceeding, the nominee might have tip-toed off of the firing line
a
t
t
e
with a charming personal anecdote or a folksy appeal to common sense,
m
p
t
but that door is now closed.) T he nominee's answer must resound in
tterms that the public
o
will understand; but, it must also reflect a level of
seriousness and erudition commensurate with the position to which she
aspires and must survive at least cursory vetting by academic and professional commentators.
29 I n
s h o r t , B. The Characteristics of a Successful Answer
i t A successful answer to such a loaded question requires not only the
proper
m u tone
s but
t an appreciation for the several layers on which the
question
b
eoperates. Discussions of the judicial role inherently call to mind
a
mixture
prescriptive, and normative questions. While in
s t u ofddescriptive,
i
some
contexts
we
might
productively cabin our discussion of judging to
o u s l y
one
or
two
of
these
axes,
it is clear that our fictional nominee does not
" m i d d
h
l e b r o
a
Justice
the nominee would be; but, any answer the prospective Justice
w . " "
gives
will
be vetted for consistency with the actual work of the courts
v
and
e will be dissected for potential criticisms of her future colleagues.
Furthermore,
accuracy and insight are not enough; even the wisest and
t
most
careful
answer
will fail to achieve its instrumental objectives if, for
h
a
t 28. So, with apologies to the interesting and important work done by Lawrence Solum and
others
o writing i n this vein, we will not be hearing any citation to " a virtue-centered theory of
judging."
C f Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
p
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003).
t 29. Anyone who doubts the importance for a Supreme Court nominee of looking and sounding
like
i a serious constitutional thinker, or o f minimally impressing the relevant scholarly and
professional communities, should attend to the tale of Harriet Miers.
o 30. 1 have always had an appreciation for the role of "middlebrow" communication in shaping
culture,
n
but my willingness to embrace the term stems largely from a conversation with Amanda
Frost
about
the pros and cons of different models of scholarship. I thank her for that valuable
_
exchange.
A
t
i
t
s
c
o
r
e
,
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example, it comes across as aloof
politically-sensitive
issues.
3I o r s u g goreemotionally-charged
s t s
When
envisioning and articulating alternative conceptions o f the
a
n
judicial
role,
anyone else who wishes to
u n p o our
p fictional
u l anominee—and
r
influence
our
constitutional
culture—must
keep
in mind three requisites.
a
p
p
r
o
a
First,
the
vision
must
be
descriptively
accurate:
that is, i t must be
c
h
plausibly consistent w ith the great bulk o f the Supreme Court's
t
o
decisions, particularly those in which the Court has dealt with questions
of its own powers vis-à-vis other branches of govemment.
must
32 Sbee normatively
c o n d , desirable:
i
t that is, it must forward an appealing
and achievable vision for a successful legal order. Finally , it must be
politically persuasive: that is, it must speak in terms that resonate with—
or at least do not run afoul of—our deepest cultural commitments.
IL NOTESTOWARDS AN ANSWER: A CONCEPTUAL TOOL-KIT
While it may be possible to develop and articulate an over-arching
alternative conception of the judicial role through a process of deduction
from broad postulates about the interaction between the courts, the other
branches, and the broader culture, that project has borne at most minimal
fruit over the last several decades. O ur fictional nominee—and those of
us who share in his project—might, therefore, adopt an alternative,
inductive strategy. Instead of starting at the top and working down, we
might identify a set of themes, rhetoric, and ideas about the proper functioning of the courts that meet the above criteria (descriptive accuracy,
normative desirability, and political persuasiveness) and use them as the
building blocks for constructing a broader theory. I n this Part, I identify
and briefly discuss five such themes and the role each might play in this
project.

31. Here the classic referent is Robert Bork, who, by many accounts, doomed his Supreme
Court candidacy when he explained that his primary motivation for seeking a seat on the Court was
that the Court's work would be "an intellectual feast." See ETHAN BRUNNER, BATTLEFOR JUSTICE:
How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 275-76 (1989) (recounting Bork's description of
the Supreme Court as "an intellectual feast," confirming the fear of many that Bork "just wanted to
play with ideas" and was unaware "that beyond those elegant intellectual constructs, the lives of real
people hung in the balance").
32. To be clear, my suggestion is not that a model of judging must accord with every area of
contemporary doctrine; nor do I suggest that those offering alternative models of judging cannot
critique or call for the overruling of existing case law. Rather, I merely point Out that, in order to
achieve plausibility, any proposed model of judging must look broadly familiar to those attuned to
coherent doctrine and practices.
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A. The Partnership Paradigm
Scholars skeptical of the Supreme Court's recent turn to formalism
in both statutory and constitutional interpretations have frequently
invoked the language o f "partnership" to explain their vision o f the
Court's proper role.
Court
33 Tought
h eto conceptualize itself as working in tandem with some other
entity—be
p a r t nit the
e rlegislature, the Framers, or earlier Courts—toward some
common
end.
s h i p
of a more assertive judiciary, the partnership model
m For
o advocates
d
has
great
appeal.
T
he
core insight of the partnership metaphor is that
e
l
judges should be unapologetic about judging. I n conceptualizing an
s
u
g
g
ongoing, nonhierarchical relationship between branches of government
e
s
t
s
(or between generations) this model has the potential to purge the guilt
tthat mosthjudges have internalized from a constitutional culture obsessed
a
t
with the counter-majoritarian
objection and originalist methodologies.
t34 The partnership model also has the virtue of grounding claims for a
h
more
robust judiciary in the core principles of American constitutionale
ism. As legal historians have long explained,
c tconstitutional
with
35
h ue A m self-government
e r i c a n was made possible by a breakre x rpin political
through
that a sovereign people acting
e r i theory:
m e the
n realization
t
collectively
can—and
probably
should—divide
u p the duties and
e
n
responsibilities
of governance among different entities without designatt
ing one such entity as "sovereign." In Justice Kennedy's famous phrase,
the Founders "split the atom of sovereignty."
ultimately
36 I f isovereign,
t
i sand allt branches
h e are doing their bidding according
to
p rules
e oproscribed
p l efor nominal, substantive reasons, then judges should
undertake
their
w
h
oduties with pride and a sense of purpose.
a
r
e
33. For a discussion of the role of the partnership metaphor in the battle over methods of
statutory interpretations, see Molot, supra note 2, at 6-7 (contrasting the "faithful actor model" with
a view of judges as "coequal partners" and "members of a coordinate branch of government that
share equal responsibility for law elaboration"). F or one among the many constitutional theorists
who use the language o f "partnership," see generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAI NCLO T HES: A T HEO RY OF AMERI CAN CO NST I T UT I O NAL PRACTICE ( 2004) .

34. Concern—most would say obsession—with the Democratic legitimacy o f judicial
decisionmaldng is a nearly ubiquitous feature of American constitutional theory. Credit for kicking
off the modem wave of concern over the subject usually goes to ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANG ERO US BRANCH ( 1962) .

35. Despite its arguably snide tone, the best book on the emergence of the theory of popular
sovereignty during the revolutionary era is still EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THEPEOPLE: THE
RISE OF PO PULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENG LAND AND AMERI CA ( 1989) .

36. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy was speaking about issues of federalism when he coined the metaphor, but the same
analytic move necessary to justify American federalism was also required to explain the existence of
co-equal branches of government.
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While the partnership metaphor has substantial utility for someone
seeking to explain why the prevailing vision of the judicial role is unduly
cramped, standing alone it does not provide an alternative vision. When
viewed in the abstract, the partnership model simply begs too many
questions: With whom are judges in partnership? T o what ends? O n
what terms?
cannot
answer basic questions about what it is that a judge is supposed
37
to—or
not supposed to—do. Those answers must come from sources
W i t his o
external
to
the notion and language of partnership. Perhaps, then, the
u t
notion
a n of
s judicial partnership is better thought of as a paradigm within
which
to
w e r build an alternative vision of the judicial role, rather than a
vision in and of itself.
s
t
B. O f Rights and Remedies
o
t
hPerhaps the single aspect of the Court's recent anti-litigation decisions that most raises the hackles of non-legal audiences is the frequency
e
s
with which the Court's decisions leave individuals, whose rights have
e
been infringed, without viable remedies.
q
u
observers
of both natural justice and of our legal system's
38
S u as
c violations
h
e
s
founding
d
e c icommitments.
s i o n s A f t e r all, Justice John Marshall's rhetorical
tquestion
i o
s t rin Marbuty
i k ev. Madison wondering, " I f [Marbury] has a right
n
s
and, if that
m
a rightnhas been
y violated, do the laws of his country afford him
,a remedy?"
learned
t i s Americans.
39
h
o n Now,
e those better versed in legal doctrine understand that our legal
system
e f has treated that precept as aspirational rather than prescriptive. I n
o
a
p
t long
h aline of cases stretching back to Marbury itself, our courts have
recognized
that—for a variety o f legal, practical, and institutional
r
t
e
reasons—some
rights are simply under- or un-enforceable.
n
f
ee
that
413
o s uofgcourts
g e iss tot remedy all violations of rights with a
r the
sT purpose
w
h
l
ii
p
n
e
37. When more formalist scholars criticize those who adopt the language of "partnership," their
m
scriticism more often than not is aimed at the partnership scholars' claims about these subsidiary
questions. C f Motor, supra note 2, at 6-7 (characterizing the partnership position in the statutory
o
interpretation
debate as including claims of "coequal" status with the legislature and the subject of
d
f
that partnership as "law elaboration").
je 38.
u Many of the Court's litigation-hostile decisions specifically foreclose the availability of
ld
remedies
i for individuals who have—or are likely to have—meritorious claims. Som e such decisions, like Ledbetter, are case- or statute-specific. Others, like the Court's broad embrace of qualicfied andi sovereign immunity, are more general.
a 39.l Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,162 (1803).
w 40. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law,
109 YALE 1,..1.87 (1999) (demonstrating the persistence of a gap between rights and remedies and
rarguing that,
i under some circumstances, the gap serves salutary purposes).
t
i
n
g
m
o
s
t
f
a
m
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"though the heavens may fall" zeal would certainly raise questions about
the descriptive accuracy of one's theory of judging.
Nevertheless, there is certainly some room to employ the language
of rights and remedies in defining and advocating for a more robust
judicial role. A s many commentators have demonstrated, the modem
Supreme Court has become increasingly sanguine about issuing decisions that leave important rights un- or under-protected.
major
41 T difference
h e r e between
i sacknowledging
a that a one-to-one fit between
rights and remedies is a practical impossibility and losing sight of the
core institutional goal of providing efficient and effective relief to those
whose substantive entitlements have been improperly trampled. Returning focus to the goal of calibrating remedies to rights is a politically
potent and substantively sound tool for exploring and articulating the
contours of the judicial role.
C. O f Law and Equity
According to a common (and largely accurate) story, once upon a
time there were two systems of courts in the Anglo-American world: law
courts, which enforced a more established set of rules often without
regard to their consequences, and equity courts, which applied freefloating principles to smooth the rough edges o f the common law .
Under our current structure of federal civil procedure, a single set of
42
federal courts possess all (or more accurately most) of the powers that
traditionally belonged to both law and equity courts.
the
43 tale
O of
n the
e Rehnquist
w a and
y Roberts
t years
o is to argue that the Supreme
Court
become uncomfortable with its equitable role.'
t e hasl increasingly
l
While that diagnosis is not perfect, it resonates very well with the
tenor and substance of many of the Court's decisions. Lik e the rights
and remedies language discussed above, the language of law and equity
has both substantive and political appeal for those seeking to construct an
alternative model of judging. Both substantively and rhetorically, "law"
and "equity" stand out as a sort of judicial "yin" and "yang": a paired set
of approaches to the administration o f justice that must be properly

41. See, e.g., id.; see also Thomas, supra note 10; Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium:
The Fundamental Right to a Remedy, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004).
42. For one abbreviated version of the tale, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 26 (2d ed. 1985) (describing how equity courts at one time applied loose principles
of equity in an ad hoc fashion but eventually developed a coherent set of principles of their own,
"almost a system of antilaw").
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There is one form of action—the civil action.").
44. To some extent, that is the story Judith Resnik tells in Resnik, supra note I.
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balanced in order for a court system to function properly." W h i l e
denigration of the "law" side of the equation leads to ad hoc judging and
threatens chaos, denigration of the "equity" side of the equations leads to
excessive formalism and threatens justice. A vision of the judicial role
that conceptualizes the "good judge" as someone who properly balances
the legal and equitable impulses, has substantial potential to add texture
and substance to our cultural conversation about judging.
D. Questions of Institutional Competence
For several generations before the 1980s, the ideas of the "Legal
Process" school represented the orthodox approach in conversations
about the judicial role." Legal Process orthodoxy was subject to a host
of legitimate criticisms and cracked under the strain.
recount
and
47 I these
h a criticisms
v e
n no
o desire for a wholesale revival of the legal
process
s p approach.
a c e However,
t at the
o risk of reigniting old battles, those
advocating for a more robust alternative to the prevailing vision of the
judicial role ought to consider the utility of some of the core insights of
the Legal Process school. In particular, there may well still be mileage in
the proposition that, when determining how to divide the labor o f
democratic governance, we ought to focus our attention on the relative
competence o f different institutions t o answer different types o f
questions." Under such an approach, our tolerance for judicial judgment
is differentiated depending on the nature of the questions and dispute
before the court. Judicial expertise becomes the ticket to more active
judicial engagement on some matters, say questions of remediation and
procedure. A renewed focus on institutional competence would demand
a more nuanced alternative vision of the judicial role: one that acknowledges that there are many areas in which a court must be hesitant to go in
45. To be clear, I am not suggesting that there would be much profit in making technical arguments about the traditional roles of equity courts and law courts; nor am 1 suggesting that traditional
courts of either stripe behaved in the stylized way implied by this dichotomy. M y point is that, with
at least some degree of basis in fact, "law" and "equity" have come to represent different approaches
to judging—different judicial impulses i f you will—and that the side of judging associated with
"equity" has been under attack in recent years.
46. The "Legal Process" school of looking at questions about the power of judges and the roles
of different institutions is largely traceable to two works: HENRY M . HART, JR. & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERALCOURTSAND THEFEDERALSYSTEM (Foundation Press 1953) and the oftcited, though n e v e r
-PROBLEMSIN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Cambridge, Mass., Tentative ed. 1958). For
pa uclear
b l i sdiscussion
h e d , of the basic principles at the heart of this approach, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Reflections
H
E N on
R theYHart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).
47.. For a discussion of some of the reasons for the (partial) decline of the legal process model,
M
see Fallon,
supra
note 46, at 971-76.
H
A
R
48. See Id at 974 ("The best Legal Process scholarship continues to consider issues of how to
T
,
get the 'best' performances from various institutions of government, including courts.").
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order to avoid stepping on the toes o f better-positioned legislators o r
administrators, yet also one that actively seeks to identify those cases and
questions that are best addressed through the unapologetic application of
judicial judgment to concrete legal disputes.
E. Litigation as Democracy
As I have written elsewhere, litigation is, at its core, a quintessentially democratic a ctivity.
4 9 " A betters
so-called
n y o into
n ecourt and make them answer before a body whose
job
o i t fis to neutrally adjudicate that d isp u te ."
5believe
a() Tn ion tyh et democratic
h o s e promise
o o f flitigation, t h e court-closing
udecisions
s
o s co f the
i Rehnquist
a w
h Roberts
o Courts run contrary to our basic
and
lcivic principles. Th e re is rhetorical and analytical power in thinking
s
tbarriers
a to tlitigation as part and parcel o f a broader assault on deabout
u
s norms. T h e rig id enforcement o f court-closing rules, the
mocratic
c
a interpretation o f remedial statutes, and the expansion o f
parsimonious
n
doctrines like qualified and statutory immunity that categorically exclude
d
r
some
transgressors
f ro m monetary lia b ility, th wa rt th e exercise o f
a
g citizenship i n mu ch th e same wa y a s butterfly ballots
democratic
t
h
eoverbroad felon disenfranchisement campaigns.
and
intentionally
ithinking
r
51 I n about the role o f the judge, some attention might be given to
replacing the notion o f a judge as gate-keeper with the image o f judge as
facilitator o f democratic participation. T h o u g h the contours o f this
argument are probably the least developed o f any o f the sets o f tools
mentioned in this Part, they provide yet another fertile area in which
those seeking to grow a new theory o f the judicial role might profitably
QCI
AN
_

49. Siegel, supra note 1, at 1159-60 & n.256; Andrew M. Siegel, From Bad to Worse?: Some
Early Speculation About the Roberts Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor, 59 S.C. L. REV.
851,862 (2008).
50. Siegel, supra note 49, at 862.
51. For some more direct links between the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation and its
handling of the 2000 Florida election controversy, see Siegel, supra note 1, at 1176-96.

